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No . 72-1188

( ~ ~a:J'lJ~l) Reservists Comm,
Unles

}iy memory fails me, you have been spared during

your first two terms on the Court any really hard standing
cases .

\JI~
(J

I think standing and justiciability are among the

~ _:_:_:_:_t_:~:~ic;;:sd:~::i:::s::t:h::t:o:::~:i:::s::t::~:n:: a
novel question of constitutional interpretation .

Since

(1) the standing issue raises an apparent conflict between

....

....

this Court ' s opinion in Levitt and Judge Gesell ' s opinion ,
and (2) the justiciability issue was specifically left
open in Powell , I would grant cert .

GRANT

LAH

(

Preliminary Memo

,

'

April 20, 1973 Conf.
List 1, Sheet 3
No • 7 2- 118 8 CFX

Cert. to CADC (Sobeloff,
Wright, Rohi.nson, aff'g
without opinion)

Timely with
extension by
the Chief
Justice

RICHARDSON

v.

Federal Civil

RESERVISTS COMMITTEE

TO STOP THE WAR

1.

Art. I, Section 6, Cl. 2 of the Constitution

provides thats
No Senator or Repre sent ative shall, during the
Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any
civil Office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been cncreased during such time;
and no Person holding any Office under the UnitejL-States, shall be a Mem~ er of either House during
~
his Continuance in Office.

C

Plaintiffs, an association of present and former
Reservists organized to oppose the war in Vietnam, and five
individual members of that organization, sued in the capacities,
alternatively, of Reservists, of persons opposed to the Vietnam
War, as taxpayers, and as citizens, to enforce the ''incompatibility
clause".

They sought a declaratory judgment and injunction

against the Sec'y of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army,

-

Navy, and Air Force upon the undisputed showing that 117
Senators and Representatives hold co;nmissi.ons in the Army,
~ · Air Force or Marine Corps. Reserves.

JI did

Plaintiff~respondents

not seek to remove any elected representatives from office,

nor did they seek a declaration that any such representatives
lack the qualifications for the Senau~ or House.

Rather, they

asked that the Executive Branch be directed to eliminate any
office inconsistent
The USDC,

constitutional mandate.
concluded in a long opini.on that

respondents had standing to raise the claim, that the matter
was justiciable, and that relief must be grJnted plaintiffrespondents on the merits.
was entered.
2.

Accordingly declaratory judgment

Injunctive relief was denied.
The USDC decision.

----

The lJSDC concluded tfiat

respondents had standing only as ordlnary citizens.

The

controversy was irrelevant in relation to resps' stature
Reservists or citizens opposing the Vietnam War, in the court's
view.

Nor was resps' status as taxnay0rs sufficient, for

the inco.£1l.pa ti bi li ty clause could not \w cons trued as a limi ta ti on
on the taxing and spending power of COI18ress.
392 U.S. 83.

Flast v. Cohen,

However, resps were ch}emr.d to have standing as

·citizens of the United States.
(, . '

The court recognized that in

very few instances will undifferentiated citizens have
· owever, several factors led the court to beli.eve

standing.

-- _______________________

that.... this was one of those rare instances.
First, while any injury which might result from
Congressmen holding Reserve commissions is
hypothetical, the hypothesis is not concocted by
plaintiffs but underlies the constitutional
provision itself. Like a conflict-of-interest
statute, the constitutional bar addresses jtse]f
to the otential for undue influence r t ·
to its rea 1zat1on. *** The Court will not lightly
conclude that a constitutional provision so highly
regarded and hotly debated by the Framers serves no
real purpose.
Second, the issue tendered i& a narrow one and
involves a precise self-operative provision of the
Constitution. This is not a case where plaintiffs
seek "to employ a federal court a.s a forum in whi. ch
to air [their] generalized grievances about the
conduct of government or the allocation of power
in the Federal System." Flast v. Coher1, st~Qra, at 106.
Third, the interest in maintaining independence
amon the br c1es of ovcrrunent is shared by all
citizens equally, and since t11s is the primary
if not the sole purpose of the bar against
Congressmen holding executive office, the interest
of plaintiffs as cttizens is undoubtedly one which
was intended to be protected by the cons ti tut i onal
provision involved.
Finally, there can be no doubt that thi.s is a
"case or controversy" in the common meaning of those
words; the parties sharply conflict in both their
interests and their views, and the case was ably
briefed and argued. It is not irrelevant t~
not
t if these laintiffs cannot 0BEa1n judicial
~t1 on
1en as a
ac 1ca

/

1

Relying on the wording of the clause and the original

version of the clause as presented to the Convention, (the
clause originally made members of either house "ineligible to
and incapable c£ holding any office"), the government argued
in the district court that the clause states only a qualification

for membershi p in

(

office.

Congress,

not a qualification for executive

Therefore, no cause of action can lie against these

executive defendants to remove Congressmen from Res e rve offices;
rather, the only remedy is to rem ove the Reserve officer from
hi. s seat in Congress.

Si.nee, under Art. I, § 5, each House i. s

the "Judge of the Qualifications of its own Members", no remedy
may be sought in any court, as review would be barred under
the political question doctrine.

The di.strict court researched

the hi.story of the clause extens ively, and concluded that the
portion here relevant -- the second part of the clause -- was
not hotly contested, and its mea nin g was never questioned, the
Clause was intended simply to d~clare the i.ncompati.bi.li.ty of
a seat in Congress and an offi c e in the Executive or Judiciary.
Two other factors led the court: to tl"w conclusion that a cause
of action was stated here.

First, the court could find no

instance of Congressional enforc cmr;.. -i t: of the clause against
an elected Congressman who held Re se rv e office at the time
he first entered Congress.

[There have been instances when

the clause was enforced against s0at e d Cong ressmen who thereafter
accepted office while sti 11 in Con [,rc~.s s.

J

It is the settled

rule that in the case of incompa t Lblc offices, "acceptance of
the second office vacates the fi rs l.."
Cong. , 1st Ses s. , at 4 (1916).

Sc c ::J ;;_d,

11.R. Rep. No. 885, 64th

from this settled rule,

and from the executive power, th e lJS DC considered it clear that
the executive branch had the ri rs h r and power to remove Congressmen
from the Reserve Offi_ces which th c>y ~10ld at the time of their
election, and that their failur e, to do s o co 11ld be judicially
reviewed.

[It is important to n ~tr that the USDC's judgment

related only to "offices" held lJy Con r~r c~s smen at the time of
their election.]

On the meri. ts, the USDC considered two questi. ons 1

(

(1) the meaning and purpose of the clause; and (2) whether,
under the clause, a commission i.n the Reserve is an "office
under the United States~

Primary reliance was placed by the

USDC on the proceedings of the Consti.tutional Convention and
the Federalist Papers.
(1)

The original wording of the Clause was:

The members of each House shall be ineligible to,
and incapable of holding any office under the
authority of the United States, during the time
for which they shall respectively be elected; and
the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to,
and incapable of holding any such office for one
year afterwards.
The clause contains two prohibitions, in its initial and current
form.

First, it prohibits the simultaneous holding of

incompatible offices.
, ...

Second, the original version flatly

. i'

prohibited the appointment of a member of Congress to
office during his term of office (plus one year for Senators),
regardless of whether he would resign to accept the office.
This is the ineligibility clause.
The incompatibility clause was widely accepted in
the Convention, and was not debated at great length.
prohibition is absolute.

Its

According to Hamilton [in t~e debates]

this clause provLded "that when a m(?mber tal<.es his seat, he
should vacate every other office."

l Farrand, Records of the

Convention of 1787, at 381-382.
The ineligibility clause, however, was hotly contested,
and was ultimately changed to permit a member to accept another
office during his term if he re signed and if the office was not
one with respect to which the emoluments were increased during
the member's term i.n office, or one created during such term.

USDC concluded that the incompatibility clause was intended

(

to declare an incompatibility of legislative and executive or
judicial offices.

It was not a standing qualification for

membership in Congress.

It was designed to protect the

integrity of a three-branch government, and the separation
of those branches.
(2)

USDC concluded that a commission in the

Reserve was an "office under the United States."

The Reserve

'1-..._

is divided into Ready, Standby, and Retired components.

Most

Congressmen and Senators are classified in either Standby or
Retired Reserves.

Standby Reservists receive no pay, but

can participate in training, earn promotions, and earn
retirement credits.

Retired Re s ervists can receive pay, though

less than twenty Congressmen in this component do so.

All

Reservists are subjectm call to active duty without their
consent in time of war.
USDC relied on United St ~ tes v. Har~well, 6 Wall. 385,

-

393 (1867)(0ffice means "a public station, or employment,
conferred by the appointment of Government.

The term embraces

the ideas of tenurE~, duration, emoluments, and duties,") for
some authority that a Reserve commi. ssion was an office under
the United States.

Direct authority, however, was provided by

the House Report cited supra.

In 1916, after the militia of

the several states was federalized as the National Guard, the
House Committee on the Judici.ary considered at length whether
a commission in the 1916 National Guard was an office under
the United States.

I

The Committee concluded that a Congressman

was not entitled to hold a commission in the Guard.

USDC

concluded that a commission in the Reserves could not be

distinguished.

( .,,

Indeed, Reserve officers are appointed by the

President and retain their commissions at his pleasure; Guard
officers in 1916 were not appointed by the President, and
the commissions were for definite terms.
The government relied on 5 USC§ 2105(d), enacted in
1930, which provided:
A Reserve of the armed forces who is not on active
duty or who is on active duty for training is
deemed not an employee or an individual holding
an office of trust or profit • • • under • • •
the United States because of his appointment,
oath, or status, or any duties or functions
performed or pay or allowances received in that
capacity.
While admitting that there was some indication in the floor
debates on this bill that it would remove a Reserve officer
from the defi.ni tion of "office" under the Constitution, the
USDC concluded, citing the views of the Military Affairs
Committee (Sen. Reed), that the bill should not be understood
to reach this situation.

Rather, the narrow purpose of the bill,

as explained in the House Report, was to "remedy a situation
occasioned by a ruling of the Attorney General that prevents
Reserve Officers, who are attorneys at law, from practicing
before the Treasury Department or from performing other work
that the law forbids officers of the Government to undertake."
H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1930).

To like

effect, in the USDC's view, was Sj_mmons v. Uni.Ced States, 55
Ct. Cl. 56 (1920), a decision~rendered before the above bill

5

which permitted Reserve officers to prosecute claims against
the United States in the Court of Claims despite a statute

C..J

(now 13 USC§ 205) which barred officers of the United States
from doing so.

Both the 1930 Act and the 1920 decision,

in the USDC's view, were of limited scope and related to

(

specific problems not involving Congressmen.

And in any

event those cases dealt with the relationship between the
Executive Branch and a private citizen.

The compatibility

clause relates to the relationship between the Executive
Branch and the Legislative Branch.

The potential conflict

in the latter instance is not inconsequential, and in view
of that the Framers erected an inflexible barrier.
In light of the exhaustive and well-written opinion
of the USDC, D.c.

,

the CADC affirmed wi_ thout opinion, relying

on the district court's opinion alone.

CADC added,

"We are

also of the view that plaintiffs have the requisite standing
and that their claim is judicially enforceable under the
rationale of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), and Bak~.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)."
3.

Contentions.

a.

SG asserts that respondents did not have standing.

no "injury in fact" has been shown,
He argue s, correctly, that ....._

:

,.

and that this Court has never grantc~d standing without such a
showing.

Sierra Club v. Morton,

tf O'.:i

U.S. 7 27.

SG also cites

Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, a case in which th.Ls Co11rt dismissed
an action for lack of standing.

The action sought to challenge

the qualifications of a Justice of the Court under the ineligi_bility
provision of Art. I, § 6, Cl. 2.

Under that decision, one would

have to show, in order to have standing,

"that he has sustained

or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a
that action and it is not :, uffi_ ci_ent that he has merely
interest common to all m0mL)ers of the public."

.J

This case, of course, arose under a different provision of the
same clause involved here.
Flast

Insofar as the CADC indicated that

would support standing as a taxpayer, SG agrees with

the USDC analysis on this point, supra.
b.

SG next argues, in conclusory fashion, that

the incompatibility clause provides a qualification of office,
and qualifications, under Art. I, §5, Cl. 1, rest within the
exclusive authority of each House.

SG further notes that this

precise question was left open in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 520 n.41.

If, as the SG argues, this is a qualification,

the question presented here is not a proper subject for
judicial scrutiny.
c.

Baker

v. Carr, 369 US, at 217.

Finally, on the merits SG contends that

commi ~sions in the Standby or Retired Reserves are not offices
under the United States, even under the standard enunciated in
Hartwell, supra.

Such Reservists have no duties of a permanent

nature; they are not subject to discipline; they receive no
emoluments; and the retirement pay is independent of their
Reserve Status and is in the nature of a pension.

Moreover,

the commissions are for an indefinite term and are held during
the pleasure of the President,

Such a commission is v~stly

different from a commission in the Regular Army or service in
the Cabinet.

With its intermittent, noncontinuous duties and

its limited relationship with the executive branch, such a
commission seems neither inherently repug nant to the congressional
office nor an encroachme nt on the independence of the legislative
branch.
d.

Respondents assert that there is sufficient

•
ground for standing under Flast.
)

There is a logical nexus

be~ween the status of citizen and the claim sought to be
adjudicated.

And injury in fact results from the potential

for undue influence created by violarion of the clause, a
precise self-operative provision of the Constitution, which
presented a narrow issue, not a generalized grievance about the
conduct of government.

The fact that the injury is shared

by all citizens does not mean that Lt ts less deserving of
legal protection through the judicial process.

In other

respects the response tracks the dist.:rict court's decision,
discussed above.
d.

There is an amicus brrief in support of

petr SG by the Reserve Officers Association, a federally

CY

chartered corporation committed, i.n i. ts words, to "the support
of a military policy for the United States that will provide
adequate national security, and to promote the development
and execution thereof.

***

The Association's aim is to

keep America strong in a perilous worJd,"

4.

Discussion.

substantial questions.

Thi.,,_s

Cti :-:. r

Arnicus adds nothing.

c"J early presents

Regardless of one's views about the

de~ionbelo;:"" it is ~lear that

I

affirm it Ex Parte .Levitt

tD

would probably have to be overrulerl.
question was left open in Powel 1.

The justiciability

And tl1P question on the

merits is one of first impression.
The only way to avoid grilnti n0 thts case, as I see it,
would be to hold it for No. 72 °~~~'.) . ll.!2.it" cd States v, Richardson,

...

\,

the C.I.A, funding case, which

Pr< '.'·c~nrs r1

standing issue which

•
i

could bear on this case.

However, in Richardson the plaj_ nti. ff s

sought standing as taxpayers under Flast, and the resolution of
that standing issue would not necessarily resolve the standj_ng
issue presented here.

There is a response.

Apri 1 6, l 97 3

,r·\.'
'·

>

Bezanson

Op. CADC and USDC
in Petn Appx.

Conf. 4/ 20/ 73
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CHAM BERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

.,
f.

May 22, 1974

.

~.~·

.,

72-1188, Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop
the War

\'

Dear Chief,
I shall probably write a brief concurring opinion in this case.

"

Sincerely yours,

-

r

...

-:

. .,
-".;·

The Chief Justice

•

-~

~

.
I

Copies to the Conference
-:

/....
'.,.
..

..

"", ..
,. '

•

l

June 3, 1974
....

.;,,,
•.'·"

·,,

Ko. 72-1188 Schlesinger v. Reservists
Dear Chief:

I em prepared to join your fine opinion for the Court
in the above case.
I do have a bit of a nroblem with one sentence on page
15, as marked on the enclosed draft. The sentence is a
flat holding that the decision rests on the requirements of
Article III. This sentence is not entirely consistent with
my reading of the precedents, especially Baker v. Carr, as
I have indicated in my concurring opinion in United States
v. Richardson. While Article III undoubtedly hovers {n the
background, our more recent cases have addressed and turned
on prudential rather than constitutional barriers.

,·'\
,:
,•,
'

I believe this one sentence could be eliminated without
other changes in your fine opinion or without diluting its
force.
Sincerely,

.,

The Chtef Justice
lfp/ss

'·

,,

~Utttmtt ~cud cf tlrt ~nitdt ~tatts~as-fringtcn. 18. ~. 20~}~.;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 4, 1974

Re:

No. 72-1188 - Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

0~

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

-

____ _
,

___.,._-

___

...,.,...,..,..

'•
~

..!.

'

~n.µnme ~o-nrf .cf ffye 'Ja.ttileh ~frurg
~a:tt!rmgton, tB. ~. 2.offe)l-~
CHA M BERS OF

JU S TI CE W I L LIAM H . REHNQUI ST

June 6, 1974

Re:
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To: Mr . Justice Douglas
Mr . Justice Brennan
.Mr . Justice Stewart
.Mr . Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
.Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
2nd DRAFT

From: '.J.'he

l,h.un

Justice

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA<f~ulated:
No. 72-1188

--:-:-:-:-:----:---Rec i r ou la tad: JUN
6 1974

James R. Schlesinger, SecreOn Writ of Certiorari to
tary of Defense, et al.,
the United States Court
Petitioners,
of Appeals for the Disv.
trict of Columbia CirReservists Committee to Stop
cuit.
the War et al.
[May-, 1974]
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of
the Court.
We granted certiorari, 411 U. S. 947 (1973), to review
the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming, without
opinion, the District Court's partial summary judgment
for respondents declaring that "Article I, Section 6,
Clause 2 of the United States Constitution renders a
Member of Congress ineligible to hold a commission in the
Armed Forces Reserve during his continuance in office."
323 F. Supp. 833, 843 (D. D. C. 1971). We hold that
respondents do not have standing to sue as citizens or
taxpayers. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
therefore reversed.

I
Article I, § 6, cl. 2, of the Federal Constitution provides:
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the
time for which he was elected, be appointed to any
civil office under the authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been increased during such time;
and no person holding any office under the United
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States, shall be a Member of either House during his
continuance in office."
The Constitution thereby makes Members of Congress
ineligible for appointment to certain offices through the
limitation of the Ineligibility Clause, and prohibits Members of Congress from holding other offices through the
latter limitation, the Incompatibility Clause.
Respondents, the Reservists Committee to Stop the
War and certain named members thereof ,1 challenged th~
Reserve membership of Members of Congress 2 as being
1 The Committee, located in California, is a national unincorpo.rated association of present and former officers and enlisted merrt•
hers of the Reserves, organized for the purpose of opposing the
military involvement of the United States in Vietnam and of using
all lawful means to end that involvement, including efforts by its
members individually to take all steps necessary and appropriate
to end that involvement. The five individual respondents were
all members of the Committee, residents of California, and United
States citizens and taxpayers. At the time suit was filed, four of
the individuals were in active Ready Reserve status; the status of
the fifth, then the Committee cochairman, was unspecified.
2
At the time suit was filed, 130 Members of the 91st Congress
were also members of the Reserves, which are divided into Ready,
Standby, and Retired components. By the end of the 92d Congress,
119 Members were Reservists. The 93d Congress has seen the
number of its Reservists reduced to 107, all but one of whom is
a commissioned officer, App., at 5, and none of whom can occupy
the Ready Reserve status of the individual Respondents, supra, n. 1.
Dept. of Defense Dir. 1200.7 § v, c. 2 (July 2, 1970), 32 CFR
§ 125.4 (c) (2). Of the 107, 19 are in the active and 12 in the
inactive Standby Reserve; and 76 are in the Retired Reserves, 16
of whom receive retirement pay. One other Member is in the
Army National Guard, and thus in the Ready Reserve, 10 U. S. C.
§ 269 (6), but since the governors of the various States control
appointments to offices in the Guard,· Petitioners could not provide
relief regarding such Reservists. The judgment of the District
Court did not therefore extend to this category of Reservist. 323
F. Supp,, at 838 n. 3.
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in violation of the Incompatibility Clause: They commenced a class action in the District Court against petitioners, the Secretary of Defense and the three Service
Secretaries, seeking ( 1) an order in the nature of mandamus directed to petitioners requiring them to strike from
the rolls of the Reserves all Members of Congress presently
thereon, to discharge any member of the Reserves who
subsequently became a Member of Congress, and W
seek to recla,im from Members and former Members of
Congress any Reserve pay said Members received whil~
serving as Members of Congress, (2) a permanent injunction preventing petitioners from placing on the rolls of
the Reserves any Member of Congress while serving in
Congress, and (3) a declaration that membership in the
Reserves is an office under the United States prohibited to
Members of Congress by Art. I,§ 6, cl. 2, and incompatible
with membership in the Congress.
Respondents sought the above relief on behalf of
four classes of persons. The Committee and the individual respondents sought to represent the interests of
( 1) all persons opposed to United States military involvement in Vietnam and purporting to use lawful means,
including communication with and persuasion of Mem•
bers of Congress, to end that involvement. The individual respondents alone sought to represent the interests
of (2) all officers and enlisted members of the Reserves
who were not Members of Congress, (3) all taxpayers of
the United States, and ( 4) all citizens of the United
States. The interests of these four classes were alleged
to be adversely affected by the Reserve membership of
Members of Congress in various ways .
. As relevant here, citizens and taxpayers were alleged
in respondents' complaint to have suffered injury because .
Members of Congress holding a Reserve position in the
Executive Branch were said to be subject to the possibility

;

'.

72-1188'-0PIN!ON

4

SCHLESINGER v. RESERVISTS TO STOP THE WAU

of undue influence by the Executive Branch,3 in violation
of the concept of the independence of Congress implicit in
Art. I of the Constitution. Reserve membership was also
said to place upon Members of Congress possible inconsistent obligations which might cause them to violate their
duty faithfully to perform as Reservists or as Members
of Congress. Reserve membership by Members of Congress thus, according to respondents' complaint,
"deprives or may deprive the individual named
plaintiffs and all other citizens and taxpayers of
the United States of the faithful discharge by members of Congress who are members of the Reserves of
their duties as members of Congress, to which all
citizens and taxpayers are entitled." Petn. app., at
46.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Respondents' complaint on the ground that respondents lacked standing
to bring the action, and because the complaint failed to
state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
The latter ground was based upon the contention that
the Incompatibility Clause sets forth a qualification for
Membership in the Congress, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 5,
cl. 1, not a qualification for a position in the Executive
Branch. The power to judge that qualification was asserted to rest exclusively with Congress, not the courts,
under Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 550 (1969).
The District Court concluded that it first had to de.
3 Respondents appear to have had reference in part to pressure
that conceivably could be applied to Reservist Members of Congress
through such offices as the President's power to call Reservists to
active duty without their consent, 10 U. S. C. §§ 672-75, or his
power to discharge commissioned Reservists, who serve only at hi!$
pleasure. 10 U. S. C. § 593.
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termine whether respondents had standing to bring the
action and, without citation to authority, stated:
"In recent years the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the concept of standing and in this Circuit
the concept has now been almost completely abandoned." 323 F. Supp., at 839.
The court then held that of the four classes respondents
sought to represent, " [ o] nly their status as citizens" gave
them standing to sue in this case.
Id., at 840,
The District Court denied standing to respondents as
Reservists, as opponents of our Vietnam involvement, and
as taxpayers. The court acknowledged that there were
very few instances in which the assertion of "merely the
undifferentiated interest of citizens," id., would be sufficient, but was persuaded to find that interest sufficient
here by several considerations it found present in the
nature of the dispute before it and by the asserted abandonment of standing limitations by the Court of Appeals,
whose decisions were binding on the District Court.
In response to petitioners' contention that the Incompatibility Clause sets forth a qualification only for Membership in the Congress, which Congress alone might
judge, the District Court characterized the issue as
whether respondents presented a nonjusticiable "political
question" resolution of which by the text of the Constitution was committed to the Congress under Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The court held that the
failure of the Executive Branch to remove Reservist
Members of Congress from their Reserve positions was
justiciable.
Having resolved the issues of standing and political
question in favor of respondents, the District Court held
on the merits that a commission in the Reserves is an
''office under the United States" within the meaning of

.

·,

..
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the Incompatibility Clause. On the basis of the fore ..
going, the court in its final order granted partial summary
.judgment for respondents by declaring that the Incompatibility Clause renders a Member of Congress ineligible,
during his continuance in office, from holding a Reserve
"commission"; the court denied such parts of respondents'
motion for summary judgment which sought a permanent
injunction and relief in the nature of mandamus.4 323
F . Supp., at 843.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
District Court in an unpublished opinion "on the basis
of the memorandum opinion of the District Court.'; The
Court of Appeals added that it was "also of the view that
[respondents] have the requisite standing and that their
claim is judicially enforceable under the rationale of''
Flast v. Cohen, supra, and Baker v. Carr, supra. Petitioners present three questions for review: ( 1) whether
respondents have standing, "either as citizens or as
federal taxpayers," to bring this claim, (2) whether
respondents' claim presents a "political question" not subject to judicial review, and (3) whether "membership" in
the Reserves constitutes an "office under the United
States" within the meaning of the Incompatibility Clause.
Petn., at 2.

II
A

In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 95 ( 1968), the Court
noted that the concept of justiciability, which expresses
the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal courts
4

Respondrnts did not, in thr Court of Appeals, or by cross.
pet1t 1011 hrre challrngr the Di1strict Court'8 denial of injunctive
and mandamus relief. In hght of the ground for our dis11osition
of the.case, we nred not and do not address ourselves to the validity
or scope of thr Di:;tnct Court's ruling on the merits of respondents'
,claim, or the relief it, granted .
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by the "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III, embodies both the standing and political question doctrines
upon which petitioners in part rely. Each of these doctrines poses a distinct and separate limitation, Powell v.
McCormack, supra, 395 U.S., at 512; Baker v. Carr, supra,
369 U. S., at 198, so that either the absence of standing
or the presence of a political question suffices to prevent
the power of the federal judiciary from being invoked by
the complaining party. The more sensitive and com..
plex task of determining whether a particular issue presents a political question causes courts, as did the District
Court here, to turn initially, although not invariably,5 to
the question of standing to sue. In light of the District
Court action we turn to petitioners' contention that re•
spondents lacked standing to bring the suit. Our con•
clusion that the District Court erred in holding that
respondents had standing to sue as United States citizens,
but was correct in denying respondents' standing as taxpayers, eliminates the need to consider the other questions
presented by petitioners.
The District Court considered standing as to each of
the four capacities in which respondents brought suit;
it rejected standing as to three of the four, holding that
G The lack of a fixed rule as to the proper sequence of judicial
analysis of contentions involving more than one facet of the concept
·or justiciability was recently exhibited by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, which bypassed a determination on standing
to rule that a claim was not justiciable because it presented a political question :
"The standing of a party need not come into question if a court
determines that for other reasons the issue raised before the bench
is non-justiciable."
That court thus held m effect that if no justiciable question is pre~
sented no one has standing . DaCosta v. Lai.rd, 471 F. 2d 1146, 1152
(1973) See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 731 (1972);
Fla.st v. Cohen, supra, 392 U. S., at 100.

..
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respondents could sue only as citizens. The Court of
Appeals' judgment of affirmance, based solely upon the
opinion of the District Court, did not alter the District
Court's ruling on standing. The standing question presented in the petition for certiorari is addressed to the
District Court's holding on citizen standing and seeks to
add the question whether respondents also had standing
as taxpayers. 0 Respondents do not contend that the
District Court erred in denying standing to them in
the other two capacities in which they sought to proceed, i.e., as opponents of American military involvement
in Vietnam, and as Reservists. We therefore proceed to
consideration of respondents' standing only as citizens
and taxpayers.

B
Citizen Standing
'To have standing to sue as a class representative it is
essential that a plaintiff must be a part of that class, that
is, he must possess the same interest and suffer the same
injury shared by all members of the class he represents.
Indiana Employment Division v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540
(1973); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 (1962). In
granting respondents standing to sue as representatives
of the class of all United States citizens, the District Court
therefore necessarily-and correctly--characterized respondents' interest as "undifferentiated" from that of all
other citizens.
The only interest all citizeus share in the claim advanced by respondents 1s one which presents injury in
6
The Court of Appeals did no more than affirm the judgment of
the District Court, including the latter's denial of respondents'
standing as taxpayers. Petitioners may, however, have sought to
raise the issue of taxpayer standing in this Court because of the
ambiguous reference in the Court of Appeals' judgment of affirmance
to Flast v. Cohen, supra, a taxpayer-standing case,
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the abstract. Respondeu ts seek to have the Judicial
Branch compel the Executive Branch to act in conformity with the Incompatibility Clause, an interest shared
by all citizens. The very language of respondents' complaint, supra, p. 4, reveals that it is nothing more than
a matter of speculation whether the claimed non"
observance of that Clause deprives citizens of the faith"'
ful discharge of the legislative duties of Reservist Mem"'
bers of Congress. And that claimed nonbbservance 1
stahding aloile, would adversely affect only the general~
ized interest of all citizens 111 constitutional governance;
and that is an abstract injury.7 The Court has ptevi..:
ously declined to treat "generalized grievances" about the
conduct of Governmeht as a basis for taxpayer standing.
Flast v. Cohen, supra, 392 U. S., at 106. We consider
now whether a citizen has standing to sue under such a
generalized complaint.
Our analysis begins with Baker v. Carr, supra, where the
yourt stated that the gist of the inquiry must be whether
the complaining party has
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to insure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which •
the Court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions." Id., 369 U.S., at
204.

•'

Although dealing with a case of claimed taxpayer stand-.
ing, Flast v. Cohen, supra, gave further meaning to the
need for a "personal stake" in noting that it was meant
7 The generalized nature of respondents' claim is revealed by the
scope of relief sought, i. e., removal of all Reservist Members of
Congress from Reserve status rather than the removal of only those
Reservist Members who manifested by their actions that they were
influenced by their Reserve status to ;:ict adversely to respondents'
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to assure that the complainant seeking to adjudicate his
claim was the "proper party" to present the claim "in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution." Id., 392 U.S., at 100-101.
In the circumstances of Flast, the Court held that
the taxpayer-complainant before it had established a relationship between his status as a taxpayer and his claim
under the taxing and spending clause sufficient to give
assurance
"that the questions will be framed with the necessary
specificity, that the issues will be contested with the
necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be
pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the
constitutional challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution." Id., 392 U. S., at 106.

1

While Flast noted that the "case or controversy" limitation on the federal judicial power found in Art. III is a
"blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations," 392 U. S., at 97, the Court, subsequently, in the
context of judicial review of regulatory agency action held
that whatever else the "case or controversy" requirement
embodied, its essence is a requirement of crinjury in fact."
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp, supra, 397 U. S., at 152. Although we there noted
that the categories of judicially cognizable injury were
being broadened, id., 397 U. S., at 154, we have more
recently stressed that the broadening of categories "is a
different matter from abandoning the requirement that
the party seeking review must have suffered an injury."
Sierra Club v. Morton, supra, n. 9,405 U.S., at 738. And,
in defining the nature of that injury, we have only
recently stated flatly : "Abstract injury is not enough."
O'Shea v. Littleton, - V . S. (1974) .
Ex parte Levitt, 302 P. f-;. 633 (1937) , was the only
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other occasion in which the Court faced a question under
Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, although that challenge was made under
the Ineligibility Clause, not the Incompatibility Clause
involved here. There a petition was filed in this Court
seeking an order to show cause why one of the Justices
should not be disqualified to serve as an Associate Justice.
The petition asserted that the appointment and confirma•
tion of the Justice in August 1937 was unlawful because
the Act of March 1, 1937, permitting Justices to retire
at full salary after a period of specified service, thereby
increased the emoluments of the office and that the stat•
ute was enacted while the challenged Justice was a Senator. The appointment of the Justice by the President
and his confirmation by the Senate were thus said to violate the Ineligibility Clause which provides:
"No Senator or Representative shall, during the
time for which he was elected, be appointed to any
civil office under the authority of the United
States . . the emoluments whereof shall have been
jncreased during such time. . "
The Court held :
"The motion papers disclose no interest upon the
part of the petitioner other than that of a citizen
and a member of the bar of this Court. That is
insufficient. It is an established principle that to
entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial
power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct
1n,1ury as the result of that action and it is not
sufficient that he has merely the general interest
common to all members of the public,' ' 1d., at 634.8
~ Thr Court rited a numbrr of ra~e~ in 8t1pport of 1b holding,
nearly :dl of which rontamrd language similar to that quoted
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The Court has today recognized the continued vitality
of Levitt/' United States v. Richardson, No. 72-88,5, slip
op., at 10-13; see also Laird v. Tatum, ,103 U. S. 1, 13
(1972). We reaffirm Levitt in holding that standing to
sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind
alleged here which is held i11 common by all members of
the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of
the injury all citizens share. Concrete injury, whether
actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a
dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form tradi~
tionally capable of judicial resolution. It adds the es~
sential dimension of specificity to the dispute by requiring
that the complaining party have suffered a particular injury caused by the action challenged as unlawful. This
personal stake 1s what the Court has consistently held
enables a complainant authoritatively to present to a
in text. See Mcissachusetts (Frothingham) v. Mellon, 262 U. S.
447, 488 (1923) (insufficient for a party to show "merely that he
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally:");
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129-130 ( 1922) ("Plaintiff has
only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the government be administered accordmg to law and that public moneys
not be wasted. Obviously this general right does not entitle a
private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit") ; Tyler v.
. Judges, 179 U. S. 405, 406 (1900) ("even in a proceeding which he
prosecutes for the benefit of the public . . . [the plaintiff] must
generally aver an injury pecular to himself, as distinguished from
the great body of his fellow citizens") . See also Giles v. Harris,
189 U. S. 475, 486 (1903) ("The plaintiff alleges that the whole
registration scheme of the Alabama Constitution is a fraud upon
the United States Constitution and asks us to declare it void. But,
of course, he could not maintain a bill for a mere declaration in
the air." (Holmes, J.). Cf. Newman v. Frizzell, 238 U. S. 5.37,
550 (1915) ,
ij Thr
Court ha8 also rrrPntly cited with approval two of the
principal cases relied upon in Levitt. Massachusetts (Frothingham)
,.. Mellon , supra, n. 8, wa::; U8Pd for 8Upport in 0' Shea v. Littleton,
supra, U. S., at - ., a~ was Fa.irchild v. Hughes, supra, n,
11:::ed m Baker v Carr, s·npra. 3(j9 U. S., at 208.
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bourt a complete perspective upon the adverse conse.;
quences flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding
his grievance. Such authoritative presentations are an
integral part of the judicial process, for a court must rely
on the parties' treatment of the facts and claims before
it to develop its rules of law. 10 Only concrete injury
presents the factual context within which a court, aided
by parties who argue within the context, is capable of
making decisions.
Moreover, when a court is a.sked to undertake constitutional adjudication, the most important and delicate of
its responsibilities, the requirement of concrete injury
further serves the function of insuring that such adjudi..
cation does not take place unnecessarily. This principle
is particularly applicable here, where respondents seek an
interpretation of a constitutional provision which has
never before been construed by the federal courts. First,
concrete injury removes from the realm of speculation
whether there is a real need to exercise the power of
. judicial review in order to protect the interests of the
complaining party.
"The desire to obtain [sweeping relief] cannot be
accepted as a substitute for compliance with the
general rule that the complainant must present facts
sufficient to show that his individual need requires
the remedy for which he asks." McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 164 (1914).
Second, the discrete factual context within which the
concrete injury occurred or is threatened insures the £ram.;
10
Tins is in sharp eontrast to thr political processes in which
the Congress can initiate inquiry and action, define issues and objectives and exercise virtually unlimited power by way of hearings and
reports, thus making a record for plenary consideration and solutions. The legislative function is mherently general rather than
particular and is not intended to be responsive to adversaries assert..
ing specific clauns or interests peculiar to themselves;

,.

,.
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ing of relief no more broad than required by the precise
facts to which the court's ruling would be applied. This
is especially important when the relief sought produces a
confrontation with one of the coordinate branches of the
government; here the relief sought would, in practical
effect, bring about conflict with both coordinate branches.
To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury
to require a court to rule on important constitutional issues in the abstract would create the potential for abuse
of the judicial process, distort the role of the Judiciary
in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature
•
.
and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of pro- ~
~
~l ~
viding "government by injunction."
"The powers of the federal judiciary will be adequate for the great burdens placed upon them only
if they are employed prudently, with recognition
of the strengths as well as hazards that go with
our kind of representative government." Flast v.
Cohen, supra, 392 U. S., at 131 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) .11
Our conclusion that there is no citizen standing here,
apart from being in accord with all other federal courts
of appeals that have considered the question, until the
Court of Appeals' holding now under review, 12 is also
n We bav<' <'xpre~;;ed apprehrm,ion about claim;; of 8tandmg ba;;ed
on "mere 'interest in a problem.'" See, e. g., Sierra Club, supra,
405 U. S., at 739. Earlier cases of the Court evidenced comparable
concern~. See, e g., Newman v. Frizzell, supra, n. 8, 238 U. S.,
at 552.
12
Lamm v. Volp e, 449 F. 2d 1202, 1204 (CAlO 1971); Pietsch v,
President of United States, 434 F. 2d 861, 863 (CA2 1970) (Clark,
Assoc. Justice) ; Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F. 2d 171, 174 (CA5
1969) (citing Levitt, supra); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F. 2d 236, 239
(CAlO 1969); Pauling v. McElroy, U. S. App. D. C. - , 278
F . 2d 252, 254 (1960) , cf Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F 2d 94, 97 (CAZ
1971) . And aside from the decision under review, the only other
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consistent with the recent holdings of this Court. It is
one thing for a court to hear an individual's complaint
that certain specific government action will cause that
person private competitive injury, Data Processin(/J
supra, or a complaint that individual enjoyment of
certain natural resources has been impaired by such
action, United States v. Students Challenging Regulating
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973),
hut it is another matter to allow a citizen to call on the
courts to resolve abstract questions. 13 The former provides the setting for a focus~d consideration of a concrete
mJury. In the latter, althbugh allegations assert an
arguable conflict with some limitation of the Constitu- ,
tion, it can be only a matter of sptlculation whether the
claimed violation has caused concrete injury to the particular complainant.
Finally, the several considerations advanced by the ·
District Court in support of respondents' standing as
citizens do not militate against our conclusion that it was
error to grant standing to respondents as citizens. First,
the District Court acknowledged that any injury resulting from the Reservist status of Members of Congress
was hypothetical, but stressed that the Incompatibility
opinion that appears to have ruled otherwise is Atlee v. Lai.rd, 339
F . Supp. 1347 (ED Pa.), (1972), which relied upon the dccii,iou 01

the District Court here. Id., at 1357 n. 8.
, a Thr Court of Appea'8 reliance on Baker v. Car.r, supra, is
inapposite. SCRAP pointed out that a personal stake in a fraction
of a vote in Balcer v Carr was sufficient to support standing. 412
U. S 689 n. 14. The injury asserted in Balcer was thus a concrete
injury to fundamental voting rights, as distinguished from the
abstract injury m nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by
respondents as citizens
In Baker v Carr, the Court cited with approval the early case
of Liverpool Steamship Co v Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U. S.
33 (1885), where it was held that a federal court can adjudge rights
only "in actual controvcrsieA" Id., at 39.

,,
t.
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Clause was designed to prohibit such potential for in"
jury. 1·1 323 F. Supp., at 840.
This rational~
fails, however, to compensate for the respondents;
failure to present a claim under that Clause
which alleges concrete injury. The claims of respondents here, like the claim under the Ineligibility Clause
in Levitt, supra, would require courts to deal with a difficult and sensitive issue of constitutional adjudication
on the complaint of one who does not allege "a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy." Baker v. Carr,
supra, 369 U. S., at 204. To support standing there must
be concrete injury in a form which assures "the necessary
specificity" called for by Flast, supra, and "that concret~
adverseness ... upon which the court so largely depends
for the illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
Baker v. Carr, supra, at 204. Standing was thus found
by premature evaluation of the merits of respondents
complaint.15
The Distric1, Court made analogy to conflict-of-interest statutes
which, it said, are directed at avoiding circumstances of potential,
not actual, impropriety. Wo have no doubt that if the Congress
enacted a statute C'reating such a legal right, the requisite injury
for standing would be found in an invasion of that right. O'Shea v.
Littleton, supra, 42 U. S. L. W., at 4141 n. 2; Linda R. S. v.
Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 616 n. 4 (1973); Association of Data
Procelffling Service Organization v, Camp, supra, 397 U. S., at 154.
But to satisfy the Art. III prerequisite the complaining party would
still be required to allege a specific invasion of that right suffered
by him. Standing could no1-as i1 is not here-be found in a citizen
who alleged no more than the right of all other citizens to havPgovernment conducted without what he perceived, without himself
having suffered concrete harm, to be proscribed conflicts of interest.
15
Looking "to the substantive i~ ·ues" which Flast i-;tated to be
both "appropriate and necessary" in relation to taxpayer standing
was for the express purpose of determining "whether there is a
logical nexus between the [taxpayer] status asserted and the claim
JlOught to be adjudicated." This step is not appropriate on a claim
of citizen standing since the Flast nexus test is not applicable where
14
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The District Court next acknowledged this Court's
long-standing reluctance to entertain "generalized griev..
ances about the conduct of Goverment," Flast v. Cohen,
supra, 392 U. S., at 106, but distinguished respondents'
complaint from such grievances by characterizing the
Incompatibility Clause as "precise and self-operative."
323 F. Supp., at 840. Even accepting that characterization of the Clause it is not an adequate substitute for
the judicially cognizable injury not present here. Moreover that characterization rested, as did the preceding
characterization, on an interpretation of the Clause by
way of the Court's preliminary appraisal of the merits
of respondents' claim before standing was found. In any
event, the Ineligibility Clause inyolved in Levitt, supra,
is no less specific or less "precise and self-operative" than
the Incompatibility Clause.
.
The District Court further relied on the fact that the
adverse parties sharply conflicted in their interests and
views and were supported by able briefs and arguments.
323 F. Supp., at 840. We have no doubt about the sincerity of respondents' stated objectives and the depth of
their commitment to them. But the essence of standing
"is not a question of motivation but of possession
of the requisite . .. interest that is, or is threatened
to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct."
Doremus v. Board of Education, supra, 342 U. S.,
at 435,
l
This same theme as to the inadequacy of motivation to
support standing is suggested in the Court's opinion in
Sierra Club, supra :
"But a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how
longstanding the interest and no matter how qualithe taxing and spending power is not challenged. Hence there was
no occasion for the District Court or the Court of Appeals to reacli
or evaluate what it saw as the merits of respondents' complaint,
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fled the organization is in evaluating the problem,
is not sufficient by itself to render the organization
'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' within the mean•
ing of the AP A." 405 U. S., at 739.
Respondents' motivation has indeed brought them
sharply into conflict with petitioners, but as the Court
has noted, motivation is not a substitute for the actual
injury needed by the courts and adversaries to focus
litigation efforts and judicial decision-making. Moreover,
the evaluation of the quality of the presentation on the
merits was a retrospective judgment that could have
properly been arrived at only after standing had been
found so as to permit the court to consider the merits.
A logical corollary to this approach would be the mani..
festly untenable view that the inadequacy of the presentation on the merits would be an appropriate basis for
· denying standing,
·
Furthermore, to have reached the conclusion that respondents' interests as citizens were meant to be protected by the Incompatibility Clause because the primary
purpose of the Clause was to insure independence of each
of the branches of the Federal Government, similarly involved an appraisal of the merits before the issue of standing was resolved. All citizens, of course, share equally
an interest in the independence of each branch of government. In some fashion, every provision of the Constitution was meant to serve the interests of all. Such a
generalized interest, however, is too abstract to consti.,.
tute a "case or controversy" appropriate for judicial reso..
]ution.
The proposition that all constitutional pro.,
1
"

~n SatI~fact10n of the Data Processing "zone of interest" requirement seemingly relied upon to find citizen standing does not support
such standing for two reasons: first, that case involved judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act of regulatory agency
.action alleged to have caused private competitive injury; seconq,
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visions are enforceable by any citizen simply because
citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions
has no boundaries.
Closely linked to the idea that generalized citizen inter..
est is a sufficient basis for standing was the District
Court's observation that it was not irrelevant that if
respondents could not obtain judicial review of petitioners' action, "then as a practical matter no one can." Our
system of government leaves many crucial decisions to the
political processes. The assumption that if respondents
have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is
not a reason to find standing. See United States v. Rich•
ardson, No. 72-885, decided today, slip op., at 14-15.

C
Taxpayer Standing

Consideration of whether respondents have standing to
sue as taxpayers raises a different question from whether
they may sue as citizens. Flast v. Cohen, supra, established that status as a taxpayer can, under certain limited
circumstances, supply the personal stake essential to
standing. There, the Court held that, in order to ensure
the necessary personal stake, there must be "a logical
. nexus between the [taxpayer] status asserted and the
claim sought to be adjudicated," 392 U. S., at 102. In
Flast, the Court determined that the taxpayer demonstrated such a "logical nexus" because, ( 1) he challenged
the exercise of "Congressional power under the taxing
and spending clause of Art. I, § 8 ... " and (2) "the
challenged enactment exceed[ed] specific constitutional
· limitations imposed upon the exercise of the Congres..
Data Proce,;sing required a showing of injury in fact, in addition
to the "zone of interest" requirement. Until a judicially cognizable
jnjury is shown no other inquiry is relevant to consideration of
'citizen standing.

;
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sional taxi':qg and spending power" under Art. I, § 8. Id.,
at 102-103.
Here, the District Court, applying the Flast holding,
denied respondents' standing as taxpayers for failure to
satisfy the nexus test. We agree with that conclusion
since respondents did not challenge an enactment under
Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch
in permitting Members of Congress to maintain their
Reserve status.11
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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As noted earl1rr, supra, p. 3, respondents requested the District
Court to compel petitioner· to seek to reclaim Reserve pay received
by Reservist Members of Congress. Such reliPf would follow from
the invalidity of Executive act10n in paying persons who could not
lawfully have been Resnvists, not from the invaliclity of the stat~
utes authorizing pay to those who 14wfully were Reservists,

